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CLEANING UP THE LEGAL DEBRIS LEFT IN THE WAKE OF 
WHITEWATER 
SUSAN LOW BLOCH 
We have learned a lot in the twenty-five years since Watergate. During 
the scandal itself, we confirmed that the President is not above the law. We 
learned that executive privilege is constitutionally protected, but that it is not 
absolute. 1 And, we learned that a need exists for an independent counsel, but 
that we don't necessarily need a statute to establish such an office. 
Watergate and the Nixon era spawned several so-called "reforms": the es-
tablishment of the independent counsel statute,2 presidential immunity from 
civil damage suits for official action,3 and public ownership of the President's 
official papers.4 It is interesting and appropriate, on the silver anniversary of 
these events, to evaluate these reforms: are they shining sterling or tarnished 
mistakes? What have we learned in the twenty-five years since Watergate? 
I submit we have learned several important lessons. 
First, it is dangerous to sue a sitting President as if he were an ordinary 
citizen. 
Second, it is dangerous to have an independent counsel statute, at least as 
it is presently constructed. 
Finally, the evidentiary privileges related to the Office of the President are 
extremely complex and in need of clarification. 
The recent events involving Bill Clinton, Kenneth Starr, Monica Lewin-
sky, Paula Jones et al. have raised complicated and important questions. It is 
difficult to decide them in the heat of battle, especially when the stakes are 
I. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). 
2. The independent counsel act was initially passed in 1978 as a five-year measure. See 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
591-598 (1982)). In 1982, it was extended under the Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988)). 
In 1987, it was extended again under the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. 
L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. 1991)). 
Most recently, it was re-authorized in 1994 and will expire in 1999 under the Independent Coun-
sel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 28 
u.s.c. §§ 590-599 (1994)). 
3. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, (1982). 
4. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, (1977). 
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high for the country and our system of government. To be sure, the courts 
must deal with these issues as they arise, as they have done. But, overall, it is 
unfortunate that the courts have had to decide these difficult questions in the 
midst of what can accurately be called a political war. I hope that Congress 
will revisit some of these questions in the abstract and with distance, rather 
than in the throes of battle. 
The following are some of the proposals I would recommend to Congress: 
First, Congress should consider enacting a law providing presidents with 
temporary immunity from civil damage actions while they are in office. Re-
cent events make it clear that one cannot sue a sitting President as if he is an 
ordinary citizen. Doubters should ask the following question: is there any 
other defendant who, after winning on summary judgment, might nonetheless 
face impeachment and be willing to pay $850,000 to settle a suit most people 
believe lacks merit? 
Second, Congress should reconsider the wisdom and necessity of the inde-
pendent counsel statute. Conventional wisdom is that Watergate taught us that 
we needed an independent counsel statute. The irony is that Watergate was 
resolved without such a statute. I believe most people think the investigation 
and resolution of Watergate was reasonably bipartisan and responsible. In my 
opinion, the same cannot be said, so far, of the ongoing investigation of 
Whitewater and the Lewinsky matter. 
Third, Congress should reexamine the various privilege issues that have 
arisen in the context of the Starr investigation of President Clinton. Thiee dif-
ferent privileges were litigated during this period: executive privilege, attor-
ney-client privilege, and a protective function privilege for Secret Service 
agents. The courts addressed each issue as it arose, as they were required to 
do. But I would urge Congress to dispassionately examine these privilege is-
sues in what, hopefully, will be a calm after the present storm. 
Allow me to discuss these suggestions individually. 
First, I believe the Supreme Court was wrong when it held in Clinton v. 
Jones that civil damage suits against a sitting president can proceed while he is 
in office. 5 I have argued since Paula Jones first filed her case in 1994 that the 
suit should be delayed until the President is out of office.6 Relying on Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald/ where the Supreme Court inferred an absolute immunity for presi-
dents for civil damage actions based on official conduct, I and several other 
constitutional law scholars filed an amicus brief in the Jones case, arguing that 
sitting presidents should have temporary immunity from such damage actions 
5. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,705-06 (1997). 
6. Susan Low Bloch, Editorial, Constitutional Balancing Test, WASH. POST, June II, 1994, 
at A20. 
7. 457 u.s. 731, (1982). 
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while they are in office.8 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court disagreed. The 
Court emphasized the aspect of the Nixon decision that expressed concern 
about the adverse effects such suits could have on the president's ability to 
make difficult decisions in his official capacity.9 The Court downplayed the 
other aspects of Nixon that worried about the distracting effects such suits 
could have on the president's ability to perform generally .10 The Court in 
Jones concluded that there was little reason to fear a "deluge" of civil suits and 
that such suits could proceed without being unduly distracting. 11 The Court 
asserted: " ... if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly 
unlikely [that the Paula Jones case will] occupy any substantial amount of [the 
President's] time." 12 
I would submit that the events since the Supreme Court's decision in May 
1997 have proven the Court's prediction naive and wrong. The litigation in-
volving Paula Jones has distracted the President, and the country, for a consid-
erable time. Without the case, we may never have known about Kathleen 
Willey and Monica Lewinsky, two women whose identity surfaced only dur-
ing the avid discovery pursued by Paula Jones's lawyers. One might argue 
that District Judge Susan Webber Wright could have limited discovery, but our 
discovery process is notoriously wide-ranging. Had the President been tempo-
rarily immune from the Paula Jones litigation, we probably would have learned 
of Lewinsky, not in the middle of the President's term, but only after he was 
out of office. Had we learned of her later when Clinton was no longer presi-
dent, then only Clinton, not the whole country, would pay the price. The 
Court was wrong to worry only about a deluge of such suits. What the current 
crisis makes abundantly clear is that· a single suit is enough to distract and 
maybe destroy a Presidency. We now have a new dangerous political weapon, 
and we must do what we can to dismantle it. 
Obviously, President Clinton must bear much of the blame for providing 
the fodder for these investigations. That, however, does not explain why the 
country must be held hostage. All these salacious details could have been in-
vestigated after the President left office. Then only he, and not the whole 
country, would have been distracted and punished. 
But it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will revisit this question of 
temporary immunity for the presidency. So I am hopeful that Congress will 
seriously consider the Supreme Court's suggestion in the Jones case, that if 
8. Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (U.S. S.Ct 1997) (No. 95-
1853). Amicus Brief for Appellant/Cross-appellee, Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
9. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 701-03. 
10. ld. at 705-08. 
11. /d. at 702, 708. 
12. /d. at 702. 
782 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:779 
Congress believes the president should have temporary protection from civil 
suits while in office, Congress should enact some form of temporary immu-
nity.13 Let me stress that such protection would be for the benefit of the coun-
try and the office of the Presidency, not for the particular incumbent. Specifi-
cally, I would urge Congress to establish something like the law it enacted 
years ago to protect soldiers in the military. Under the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act of 1940, the government provides immunity from suits for the 
military while they are in active duty. 14 
Such temporary immunity would not put the President above the law. In-
deed, the Supreme Court in the Jones case specifically noted that the President 
was not seeking to be placed "above the law." 15 The right to invoke temporary 
immunity would simply recognize the President's "unique status in the con-
stitutional scheme."16 Unlike the other two branches, the Executive Branch is 
represented by only one individual, the President of the United States. The 
irony is that by not giving the President some form of temporary immunity, the 
President winds up with fewer rights and less protection than the average de-
fendant. Because of political constraints, it is much more difficult for the 
President to engage in legal strategies, rely on hair-splitting definitions, or in-
voke constitutional privilege such as the right against self-incrimination, tac-
tics that are lawful, common, and acceptable approaches for the average de-
fendant. The experience our country has endured since the Supreme Court 
held that Paula Jones could proceed has not been good for the Office of the 
Presidency or for the country. 17 The most effective remedy to protect future 
presidents from politically inspired lawsuits while they are in office is for 
Congress to adopt some form of temporary immunity for sitting presidents. 
Second, I would urge Congress to repeal the independent counsel statute, 
or at least substantially modify it. I now believe that Justice Scalia was right 
in Morrison v. Olson 18 when he warned us of the dangers of the independent 
counsel statute. He was incredibly prophetic when he asked "what if they [the 
judges appointing the independent counsel] are politically partisan ... and se-
13. /d. at 709 (stating "[i]f Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger 
protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation."). 
14. See Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178 (1940)(codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 501 (1988), amended by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. I 02-12, 105 Stat. 34). Originally intended to protect soldiers 
from default judgments against them while fighting World War II, the act, as amended over the 
years, generally suspends civil actions against active-duty military personnel. Like any law that 
would grant the President temporary immunity, it recognizes that civil actions should be delayed 
to accommodate greater national purposes. 
15. 520 U.S. at 697. 
16. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749. 
17. It is also not fair to the individual who happens to hold the office. 
18. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
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lect a prosecutor antagonistic to the administration, or even to the particular 
individual who has been selected for this special treatment?"19 
As you know, the statute sunsets on June 30, 1999. If Congress cannot 
agree on a revision, it will expire and disappear. Others in this symposium 
will address in depth the specifics of the act and how it should be modified. 
Let me briefly describe several modifications I would suggest, if Congress de-
cides to re-enact some type of independent counsel statute. 
First, I would reduce the number of officials who can be targets of an in-
dependent counsel investigation. Specifically, an independent counsel should 
be considered to investigate alleged wrongdoing only by the President, Vice 
President, and the Attorney General. For the investigation of alleged wrong-
doing by other cabinet officials, I believe we can trust the Department of Jus-
tice. 
Second, I would give the Attorney General more tools with which to con-
duct the initial investigation and would raise the triggering threshold, making 
referral to an Independent Counsel more difficult. 20 
Third, I would provide time limits and budgetary constraints on the Inde-
pendent Counsel's investigation. Any extensions ofthese limits would have to 
be petitioned for, justified, and sanctioned by the appointing officials. This 
would allow for some reasonable, public check on the investigation. 
Fourth, I would consider putting the appointment power in officials other 
than judges. The Starr investigation shows how the power to appoint and 
control the independent counsel can have a tarnishing effect on the judiciary, 
making it appear too political. 
Finally, I would reconsider the wisdom and constitutionality of the provi-
sion in the independent counsel statute that requires the independent counsel, 
if he or she finds "substantial and credible information ... that may constitute 
grounds for an impeachment," to send a referral to the House of Representa-
tives.21 I believe this delegation of congressional authority to the independent 
counsel is constitutionally suspect and dangerous. Specifically, it entrusts too 
much of the House's constitutional responsibility to decide whether to initiate 
an impeachment inquiry to the independent counsel who is unelected and un-
accountable.22 Once the independent counsel drives his van to the steps of the 
House of Representatives and drops his 36 boxes of "evidence," it is very dif-
ficult for the House to decide quietly that there is nothing impeachable in the 
boxes. The House is virtually forced to vote to start an impeachment inquiry. 
19. /d. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20. For a detailed discussion of the changing triggering mechanism, see Jack Maskell, The 
Independent Counsel Law, FED. LAW. July 1998, at 29. 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c)(1994). 
22. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent 
Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193,2226-65 (1998). 
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That distorts the impeachment process, which is designed to be a dispute be-
tween the two elected branches, Congress and the President. Indeed, it is no 
accident that the Constitution vests "the sole power to impeach" in the branch 
most accountable to the people, ~he House of Representatives which faces the 
electorate every two years. The use of an unaccountable intermediary to trig-
ger impeachment transforms and grossly distorts the process. A decision to 
initiate an impeachment inquiry should be a more difficult, and more carefully 
thought-out process, than what we witnessed in the Fall of 1998 when the 
House voted to initiate an impeachment inquiry.23 
At a minimum, I would make the referral to the House non-mandatory. 
But is that alone sufficient? I'm not sure. The report of Leon Jaworski's in-
vestigation and the Grand Jury's Report and Recommendation on Watergate 
were sent to the House Judiciary Committee without an independent counsel 
statute.24 And if one believes, as I do, that a sitting president cannot be crimi-
nally indicted and tried,25 but that he can be investigated, then it is not clear 
what the investigator should do if he finds evidence of impeachable offenses. 
This is an issue warranting further study. Whether or not a new independent 
counsel statute gets enacted next year, we know from the Jaworski experience 
in the Nixon investigation that this question may still arise even without an in-
dependent counsel statute. 
Lastly, we should consider, in the event a special prosecutor or independ-
ent counsel decides to send a referral to the Congress, what to do with grand 
jury materials that are traditionally required to be secret under the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e).Z6 Starr's decision to tum the materials 
over to the House, ostensibly with the approval of the Special Division that 
appointed him, was in my opinion questionable. Normally, exemptions from 
Rule 6(e) must be sought from the presiding judge.27 Thus, I am' unsure why 
Independent Counsel Starr sought approval from the Special Division instead 
of the presiding judge, Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, other than the 
23. For an excellent summary of the events, see ASSOCIATED PRESS, Chronology of Events 
(visited June 6, 1999) <http:/Kyle.seattletimes.com/presidentlchronology/index.html>. 
24. See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Trans-
mission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370 F.Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974). 
25. Is a Sitting President Subject to Compulsory Criminal Process?, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Sept.!}, 1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center). 
26. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
27. See FED. R: CRIM. P. 6(e). In the Watergate investigation, the presiding judge, John 
Sirica, explicitly authorized the release of otherwise secret grand jury proceedings. See In re Re-
port and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to 
the House of Representatives, 370 F.Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974). See also JOHN J. SIRICA, To 
SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON 216-
18(1979). 
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obvious possible explanation that the Special Division would be easier to per-
suade than Judge Johnson. Moreover, Congress's decision to put the report on 
the internet, without even reading or screening it was, to say the least, ques-
tionable.28 We must, after the current controversy is resolved, consider these 
issues dispassionately. 
Finally, after examining the questions raised by presidential immunity and 
the indepe~dent counsel statute, Congress should reexamine the various privi-
lege issues that arose in the course of the Whitewater investigation: executive 
privilege, attorney-client privilege,29 and a protective function privilege. 
With respect to executive privilege, there is little that Congress can or 
should do. In the case of United States v. Nixon,30 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a constitutionally protected executive privilege, but the President's need 
for confidentiality must be balanced against the grand jury's need for informa-
tion relevant to a criminal investigation.31 In the Starr investigation, when 
Bruce Lindsey invoked executive privilege, Chief Judge Johnson emphasized 
that conversations between the president and his aides are presumptively 
privileged.32 Significantly, she rejected Starr's argument that executive privi-
lege cannot apply to discussions regarding private conduct.33 But, relying on 
United States v. Nixon, Judge Johnson found that the claim of privilege would 
have to yield to the grand jury's need for the information.34 That judgment 
followed Nixon and thus left little that Congress can or should do with respect 
to executive privilege. 
Regarding the claim of attorney-client privilege for government attorneys, 
Judge Johnson was confronted with three different views. The White House 
argued the existence of an absolute attorney-client privilege between the 
President and White House Counsel. 35 The Independent Counsel argued that 
no such privilege was available at all?6 The Department of Justice, in an ami-
28. Ken Starr has said that he was surprised to see the House release the Report without ever 
reading it and regrets not doing more to prevent "the total and immediate public release of the 
details." 20-20: Interview with Diane Sawyer (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 25, 1998). 
29. One question regarding attorney-client privilege that Starr raised, the question of 
whether the privilege survives the death of the client, was definitively answered by the Supreme 
Court and need not be reassessed by Congress. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
privilege survives the death of the client. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 
(1998). 
30. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
31. /d.at711-12. 
32. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp.2d 21, 25,27 (D.D.C. 1998). 
33. /d. at 25. 
34. /d. at 28. 
35. /d. at 33 (stating that "The White House claims that candid legal advice will be chilled if 
the Court does not recognize an absolute governmental attorney-client privilege in the federal 
grand jury context."). 
36. !d. at 34. 
786 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:779 
cus brief, took a middle position that the judge ultimately adopted. 37 Specifi-
cally, Judge Johnson held thatthe President possesses an attorney-client privi-
lege when consulting with White House counsel.38 But, she concluded that the 
privilege was qualified, not absolute; the privilege may be overcome when a 
prosecutor presenting a case before a federal grand jury can show a sufficient 
need for the subpoenaed communication, and the inability to get the informa-
tion from other sources. 39 
The President appealed the question of attorney-client privilege to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 40 In a 2-1 decision, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling that Lindsey had to testify, but 
on grounds that significantly narrowed the District Court's view of the privi-
lege.41 The majority held that no attorney-client privilege exists between the 
President and White House Counsel if the communications contain informa-
tion of possible criminal offenses.42 It rejected the District Judge's use of a 
balancing test. 43 
The White House petitioned for certiorari and on November 9, 1998, the 
Supreme Court denied the petition, with two justices, Ginsburg and Breyer, 
dissenting from the denial. In their view, the issue was sufficiently important 
and difficult to warrant the Court's attention.44 
In light of the Supreme Court's refusal to address the issue, at least at this 
time, it is particularly important that Congress do so. Specifically, Congress 
should study the question of attorney-client privilege for government employ-
37. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp.2d. at 32 (citing and summarizing the Attorney 
General's amicus brief). 
38. /d. at 33-4. 
39. /d. at 33, 36-7. 
40. The President appealed Judge Johnson's decision to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in the case of In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 
1998), contesting both her ruling as to executive privilege and her ruling on the question of attor-
ney client privilege. The Independent Counsel sought expedited consideration by the United 
States Supreme Court. In response, the President decided to drop the appeal of the executive 
privilege aspect of the case but continued to defend the claim of attorney-client privilege. His 
decision to drop the executive privilege claim was not surprising. The District Judge's construc-
tion of executive privilege was generous, and her balancing followed the Supreme Court decision 
in United States v. Nixon. The Supreme Court was unlikely either to grant cert on that issue or to 
give a more expansive construction of executive privilege. 
The Supreme Court rejected Starr's request for expedited consideration, United States v. Clinton, 
118 S.Ct. 2079 (1998), and therefore the appeal with respect to attorney client privilege for gov-
ernment lawyers continued in the Court of Appeals. 
41. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1101. 
42. !d. at 1114. 
43. /d. at 1119 (Tate!, C.J. dissenting from Part II & concurring in part and dissenting in part 
from Part III). 
44. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998). See infra 
note 46 and accompanying text. 
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ees who confide in government lawyers. It should invite testimony from gov-
ernment attorneys who can describe the nature and extent of the problem and 
how they think it should be resolved. This is a very difficult question and 
should be resolved only with the benefit of past experiences by government 
attorneys.45 
It is particularly important to address the question with respect to the rela-
tionship between White House Counsel and the President. As the Starr inves-
tigation made clear, impeachment is always a possibility, and that may influ-
ence the judgment about the necessity for and extent of the protection of legal 
advice provided to the President. The critical question in this analysis is who is 
the client? There are several possible answers: the United States, the Office of 
the President, the President. I think all will agree that White House Counsel 
does not represent the President as an individual. At most, White House 
Counsel represents the Office of the President or the President in an official 
capacity. To say that it represents the United States is too broad, especially 
when one contemplates the possibility of impeachment proceedings. During 
an impeachment, it is the Congress versus the Office of the President. Con-
gress has its attorneys and one would think the President should have one, too, 
presumably White House Counsel. Each lawyer represents his own branch; 
neither represents the United States. If this is the case, then a basis exists for 
the argument that all conversations between the President and White House 
Counsel should be presumptively privileged, because, as we can see from the 
Starr investigation, an investigation of the President can easily turn into an im-
peachment inquiry. It seems odd to consider a privilege corning into effect 
only after an impeachment inquiry is imminent or announced. As Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg noted in their dissent from the denial of certiorari in the 
Lindsey case: 
The divided decision of the Court of Appeals makes clear that the question 
presented by this petition has no clear legal answer and is open to serious legal 
debate .... Whether or when other opportunities for this Court to consider the 
issue arise depends upon whether or when the President, or other Government 
employees, will risk disclosing to Government lawyers significant matters that, 
under the Court of Appeals' decision, are not privileged. They may very well 
choose the cautious course, holding back information from Government coun-
sel, perhaps hiring outside lawyers instead. I believe that this Court, not the 
Court of Appeals, should establish controlling legal principle in this disputed 
matter of law, of importance to our Nation's governance.46 
For the reasons given by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, Congress should ex-
amine this difficult and very important question. 
45. The Congress just recently created a new privilege between taxpayers and tax practitio-
ners in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. I 05-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
46. 119 S.Ct. at 466. 
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The third privilege litigated in the Starr investigation is the protective 
function privilege for Secret Service agents who protect the President. When 
Starr subpoenaed several Secret Service agents, the Department of the Treas-
ury, the agency responsible for the Secret Service, asserted this privilege. 
They argued that if agents were required to testify against the President, future 
presidents would keep them at a distance and thus jeopardize the President's 
safety and the nation's security.47 
Both the District Court48 and the Court of Appeals49 rejected the claim of 
such a privilege, and the Treasury petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Su-
preme Court rejected the petition,50 a response that was not surprising and, in 
fact, one that I predicted.51 While the issue is important, no conflict existed in 
the circuits (since this was a case of first impression) and the government's ar-
gument was weak. It was crippled by the President's failure to assert the 
privilege as his own. I understand why politically the President did not want 
to assert another privilege, but without him, the claim is strained. Most privi-
leges are between two people, designed to protect and foster candid conversa-
tions, and thereby preserve the relationship. Thus, for example, privileges ex-
ist between attorney and client, doctor and patient, and husband and wife.52 
The oddity with the asserted protective function privilege is that it is not de-
signed to protect candid conversations between a secret service agent and any-
one else. The sought-after privilege is to enable the President to have candid 
conversations with whomever he pleases, viewing the secret service agent, 
who by law is required to be by the President's side,53 as mere "wallpaper." It 
seems essential, therefore, that the privilege be controlled not by the wallpa-
per, but by the President, waivable and assertable as he chooses. Under the 
logic presented in the Court of Appeals and in the petition to the Supreme 
Court, the Secret Service and subsequent Presidents could waive a prior Presi-
dent's protection; but that possibility would likely make sitting Presidents keep 
his protectors at a distance and thus undermine the whole reason for estab-
lishing the protective function privilege in the first place. Only if the President 
can control the waiving of the privilege, even when he is no longer in office, 
will he feel comfortable with his bodyguard so close to his side. 54 
I suspect many people believe there should be some limits on the ability of 
47. In reSealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), petition for cert. 
denied, No. 98-93 (U.S. July 16, 1998). 
48. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NJH), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7734, at *15-
*17 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998). 
49. In reSealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077. 
50. Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998). 
51. Presentation of this paper at St. Louis University on Oct. 16, 1998. 
52. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 507 n.13 (4th ed., 1996). 
53. 18 u.s.c. §305(b) (1994). 
54. Susan Low Bloch, When the Secret Service Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 15. 
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prosecutors to haul Secret Service agents into court to testify about the Presi-
dent's private activities. The problem is that it is difficult, although not impos-
sible, for the judiciary to craft such protection and to articulate its extent and 
limitations. Congress, the creator of the Secret Service and the institution that 
mandates the Service's responsibility . to protect the President, is better 
equipped to define such protection. Obviously, it is too late to do much to 
protect President Clinton, but I am hopeful that Congress will see the desir-
ability of addressing the question for future executives. 
One more issue that I hope Congress can address is the question of acces-
sion to the Office of the Presidency. Under the Presidential Succession Act, 
the order of succession is as follows: Vice President, Speaker of the.House and 
then President of t~e Senate Pro Tempore. 55 The events of this past year have 
made me realize that it is at best odd, and perhaps even unconstitutional, to 
have someone in line for the presidency-the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate-with a significant role in the impeachment and re-
moval of those he would replace. I think, at a minimum, Congress should re-
consider the wisdom of this. 
In conclusion, let me say that when Professor Joel Goldstein called me last 
year, in the fall of 1997,"to invite me to this symposium evaluating what we 
have learned on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Watergate, I had no idea how 
clairvoyant he was. Who would have thought he could orchestrate an im-
peachment inquiry to fall right in the middle of this conference~ I hope that 
next time Joel plans a conference, he tries to anticipate and evaluate the poten-
tial unintended consequences. I got particularly nervous when I heard that 
Joel was planning a conference next year to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
· "War ofthe Worlds." 
ADDENDUM 
Since this symposium was held in October 1998, the impeachment process 
has continued and culminated in a vote on December 19, 1998 to impeach 
President Clinton. It is ~oo early to predict the eventual outcome, but these 
events clearly make it imperative that we reassess many of the questions raised 
in this paper and in the Symposium generally. 
55. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)- (b). 
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